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Katerina P. Lewinbuk 
Keep Suing All the Lawyers1: Recent Developments 
in Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding & Abetting 
a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Abstract.  Lawyers have increasingly become subject to liability under 
various legal theories, ranging from traditional legal malpractice or negligence 
liability claims to various third-party actions.  Most recently, state and federal 
courts across the country have recognized attorney liability for aiding and 
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.  This Article will address the current 
status of the cause of action for a lawyer’s aiding and abetting her client’s breach 
of fiduciary duty, explain the commonalities and distinguish nuances as outlined 
by particular states, examine recent decisions by federal courts that have 
recognized the cause of action, and culminate in its conclusion by predicting 
how the cause of action will continue to develop in the long run.   
Author.  Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston.  This 
Article, along with all of my academic work, is dedicated to the precious 
memory of my father, Dr. Vladimir Z. Parton, who will always remain my 
inspiration.  Special thanks go to my husband Dan, my children Alexandra and 
Michael, and to my mother for their endless love and support.  In addition, I 
would like to express gratitude to my very gifted and dedicated research 
assistants, Teresa Lakho and Maggie Lu, for their assistance in preparation of 
this Article.  
 
1. The original quote states, “[T]he first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”  WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2.  The author changed 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
It has become the new norm for lawyers to face a high level of exposure 
under various legal theories, ranging from traditional legal malpractice or 
negligence liability claims to various third-party actions.2  Specifically, a 
claim alleging the aiding and abetting of a client’s breach of fiduciary duty 
has become rather common and accepted by many states in the last few 
years.3  As will be discussed later, for example, when an attorney 
misappropriates funds by substantially assisting in preparing deeds with the 
knowledge that doing so will be to the detriment of others, a court will likely 
find a valid claim of aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.4  
Prior to 2008,5 only twelve states recognized aiding and abetting a client’s 
breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action against attorneys,6 and no 
reviewing court rejected its validity at that time.7  Since 2008, eleven 
 
2. See United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings), Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227 (10th Cir. 
2000) (citing Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank Denver, 892 P.2d 230, 236 
(Colo. 1995)) (explaining “[a] negligent misrepresentation claim is based not on a contractual duty but 
on an independent common law duty . . . to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating information on which other parties may justifiably rely”); In re Temporomandibular 
Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1492 (8th Cir. 1997) (“One who undertakes . . . 
to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking . . . .” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 324A (1965))); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Lane & Douglass, 961 F. Supp. 153, 154 (N.D. Tex. 
1997) (involving a claim of legal malpractice), rev’d on other grounds, 142 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998).  
But see First Nat’l Bank, 961 F. Supp. at 156 (“In fact, several courts have held that an attorney owes no 
duty to a third party even when the attorney renders an opinion upon which he knows the third party 
will rely.” (first citing FDIC v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1563–64 (S.D. Tex. 1992); then citing 
Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384, 1494–95 (N.D. Tex. 1988); and then citing Banc 
One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (5th Cir. 1995))).  
3. See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding 
and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 146 (2008) (discussing the growing 
trend in state courts to examine claims against lawyers for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
        4.     PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
387 S.W.3d 525, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).  
5. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 146 (focusing on developments in aiding and abetting a client’s 
breach of fiduciary duty until 2008).   
6. See id. (listing several jurisdictions recognizing aiding and abetting claims, including California, 
the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas).  
7. Id. (reporting not one state has specifically rejected the validity of an aiding and abetting 
theory). 
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additional states have recognized this cause of action,8 while a handful of 
recent decisions have questioned the theory or rejected it altogether.9  
Moreover, several federal courts now allow a complaint for aiding and 
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney, even though, 
in applicable states, state courts have not yet ruled upon the issue.10  To 
 
8. The eleven states are Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.  See Rivet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
316 F. App’x 440, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2009) (recognizing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty 
under Michigan law); see also In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(noting Minnesota has recognized that aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of 
action); Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (D.N.J. 2012) (acknowledging 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of action in New Jersey); Zazzali v. Hirschler 
Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (articulating the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty 
under Delaware law); Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (finding aiding and 
abetting is a valid cause of action against lawyers in Arizona); Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 454 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reiterating the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Kahala Royal Corp. 
v. Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732, 751–52, 756 (Haw. 2007) (recognizing a 
cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but refusing to grant relief because 
the elements for the cause of action were not satisfied); Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 
323 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the duty a lawyer owes a client is higher than that of 
a typical agent-principal relationship (quoting Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978))); Gordon v. Busbee, 723 S.E.2d 822, 830 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (reciting the elements of a cause 
of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in South Carolina); PNC Multifamily Capital 
Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P., 387 S.W.3d at 558 (finding a cause of action for aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty is a “valid complaint” in Tennessee); Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 
660 (Wis. 2009) (acknowledging aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid claim in 
Wisconsin). 
9. See Bottom v. Bailey, 767 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding “no such cause 
of action [for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty] exists in North Carolina”); Veer 
Right Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Czarnowski Display Serv., Inc., No. 14 CVS 1038, 2015 WL 504977, at *3 
(N.C. Feb. 4, 2015) (“Whether North Carolina recognizes a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty remains an open question.” (citing Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough, 
No. 05 CVS 18918, 2007 WL 3071618, at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007))); see also DeVries Dairy, 
L.L.C. v. White Eagle Coop. Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (Ohio 2012) (concluding Ohio does not 
recognize tort claims against persons acting in concert); Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Looper Reed 
& McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15-00055-CV, 2016 WL 164528, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) 
(holding “the trial court correctly dismissed [an aiding and abetting] claim” where an attorney did not 
engage in an independent tortious act or misrepresentation outside of the scope of the representation 
of his client). 
10. See Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(noting “[i]t is undisputed that . . . the New Hampshire Supreme Court has yet to expressly consider 
whether to adopt the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty[,]” but concluding the Court 
“would recognize the tort, and would adopt a version incorporating . . . the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts”); see also Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 499–500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (stating 
Indiana has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but concluding 
it would not be a departure from their current causes of action for aiding and abetting); Design Pallets, 
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support their position, some federal courts reasoned that state courts in 
applicable jurisdictions would likely consider aiding and abetting in a client’s 
breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action if called upon to decide.11  
Part II of this Article will address the current status of a lawyer’s aiding 
and abetting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action (“aiding 
and abetting” cases), beginning with the prima facie case and its required 
elements.  The Article will also explain commonalities and distinguish 
nuances as outlined by particular states, analyze how these distinctions may 
affect an accused attorney, and evaluate final outcomes in specific cases.  It 
will then discuss the current state of aiding and abetting cases nationwide, 
focusing on recent opinions and how attorney liability has been addressed 
and resolved by different courts.  Subsequently, the Article will examine 
recent decisions by federal courts recognizing the cause of action, while 
noting some instances where the courts held the cause of action valid despite 
lacking such determinations by the applicable state courts.  That part of the 
Article will also discuss the factors that may have influenced the courts in 
their final determinations in aiding and abetting cases.  The Article will 
culminate in its conclusion section by predicting how the cause of action 
will continue to develop in the long run and anticipate ways in which it will 
have an impact on the legal profession as a whole.  It will also offer strategies 
for minimizing a lawyer’s exposure in light of the current status quo of 
aiding and abetting causes of action nationwide.   
 
Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (refusing to dismiss an aiding 
and abetting claim because the plaintiff had “sufficiently alleged a fiduciary duty”); Reis v. Barley, 
Snyder, Senft & Cohen, L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351–52 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (recognizing state courts’ 
refusal to expand Pennsylvania law for aiding and abetting due to lack of precedent from the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, but still finding a valid claim against the attorney), rev’d on other grounds, 426 F. 
App’x 79 (3d Cir. 2011).  
11. See Reis, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 350 (citing Pierce v. Rossetta Corp., No. 88-5873, 1992 WL 
165817, at *20–23 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1992)) (listing the three elements for a valid aiding and abetting 
breach of a fiduciary duty claim under Pennsylvania as outlined in Pierce to provide guidance to state 
courts); see also Abrams, 518 B.R. at 499–500 (discussing current causes of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty, aiding and abetting liability for torts, their relation to each other, and why a court would likely 
adopt aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action).  But see Invest Almaz, 
243 F.3d at 82–84 (providing state courts with direction by explaining the “knowledge” element in the 
adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876B despite the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
not recognizing such claims).  
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II.    CURRENT STATE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION NATIONWIDE (2016) 
Prior to 2008, twelve jurisdictions recognized a cause of action against a 
lawyer in aiding and abetting cases: California, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas.12  Since then, eleven states have 
acknowledged the cause of action’s validity: Arizona,13 Delaware,14 
Georgia,15 Hawaii,16 Kentucky,17 Michigan,18 Minnesota,19 New Jersey,20 
South Carolina,21 Tennessee,22 and Wisconsin.23  Accordingly, at least 
twenty-three states have adopted the theory to date. 
In those states, the courts disposed of aiding and abetting cases in one of 
the four following ways.  First, only two courts found an attorney liable 
under the alleged aiding and abetting theory.24  Second, some courts 
acknowledged the accused attorney “may” or “could” be found liable under 
the aiding and abetting theory without actually arriving at a specific 
 
12. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 150 (enumerating jurisdictions recognizing aiding and abetting 
claims). 
13. See, e.g., Chalpin, 207 P.3d at 677 (finding aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty a 
valid cause of action against lawyers in Arizona). 
14. See, e.g., Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (articulating 
the elements of a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware 
law). 
15. See, e.g., Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reciting the elements to 
prove a breach of fiduciary duty). 
16. See, e.g., Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732, 
756 (Haw. 2007) (addressing and aiding and abetting claim, but refusing to find an attorney liable 
because the elements of such claim were not satisfied). 
17. See, e.g., Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 323 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) 
(addressing an aiding and abetting claim against the attorney, but finding the claim must fail because 
there was no fiduciary duty). 
18. See, e.g., Rivet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 F. App’x 440, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(acknowledging the cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty exists in Michigan). 
19. See, e.g., In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1001–02 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting 
Minnesota has recognized that aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid cause of action). 
20. See, e.g., Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid cause of action in New Jersey). 
21. See, e.g., Gordon v. Busbee, 723 S.E.2d 822, 830 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (articulating the 
elements needed to prove breach of a fiduciary duty in South Carolina). 
22. See, e.g., PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. 
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 556–58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (stating a valid complaint exists when pleading 
a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty). 
23. See, e.g., Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 660 (Wis. 2009) (recognizing aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid claim in Wisconsin). 
24. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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determination on the merits.25  Third, other courts acknowledged the 
validity of an aiding and abetting theory, pointing to facts supporting the 
possibility of attorney liability while reversing summary judgment in the 
attorney’s favor, and remanding for further proceedings.26  Finally, a 
number of complaints were dismissed because the allegations did not 
support a finding of aiding and abetting liability on behalf of the accused 
attorney.27 
A.    Elements Generally 
Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides guidance for 
courts to develop a standard for establishing liability for aiding and abetting 
cases:  
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, 
one is subject to liability if he . . . (a) does a tortious act in concert with the 
other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s 
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.28  
State courts frequently apply this standard to resolve allegations in aiding 
and abetting cases.29  In such decisions, most discussions centered on the 
“knowledge and substantial assistance” aspect of the test.30  While most 
states agree that in order to establish the prima facie case for aiding and 
abetting, the accused attorney must act outside the scope of 
representation,31 state courts vary on whether constructive or actual 
 
25. See infra Part II.B.2. 
26. See infra Part II.B.3. 
27. See infra Part II.B.4. 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).  
29. See, e.g., Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the validity 
of an aiding and abetting claim in Arizona, and noting the elements of such claim are embodied in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (quoting Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters and Cement 
Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 23 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc))).  
30. See, e.g., Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (highlighting 
the importance of the Restatement’s knowledge and substantial assistance elements). 
31. See Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1062–63 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (holding an attorney 
is subject to joint liability for a client’s breach of fiduciary duty only when the plaintiff shows the 
attorney was acting outside the scope of the attorney-client relationship); see also Kahala Royal Corp. v. 
Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (concluding the plaintiff 
failed to allege that the attorneys “possessed a desire to harm . . . independent of the desire to protect 
their clients”); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 182 (N.M. 1995) (holding an attorney’s duty to a 
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knowledge is required.32  Moreover, of the courts that have outlined 
whether actual or constructive knowledge is required, some have dismissed 
cases due to a plaintiff’s inability to present sufficient facts to meet the 
applicable standard.33 
B.    New State Courts Recognizing the Cause of Action Since 2008 
As mentioned earlier, it is highly unlikely a court will find an attorney 
liable for aiding and abetting a client’s wrongdoing, and, even less likely, for 
a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.34  Two case examples—the Tensfeldt v. 
Haberman35 case decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the PNC 
Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Community 
Development Corp.36 case decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee—
are worthy of close examination. 
1.    Courts That Found Attorneys Liable for Aiding & Abetting 
In Tensfeldt, the court held an attorney liable for aiding and abetting his 
client’s unlawful act when the attorney created a will that violated the client’s 
divorce judgment.37  Although the attorney was aware of the stipulation in 
 
statutory third-party beneficiary of an action is subject to an adversarial exception).  In New Mexico, 
the Supreme Court explained that the adversarial exception negates the attorney’s duty when “the third 
party knows or should know that he or she cannot rely on the attorney to act for his or her benefit.”  
Id.  Likewise, in Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2005, pet. denied), the court found no cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty 
absent allegations of a tortious act or misrepresentation committed outside the attorney’s 
representation.  Id. at 407. 
32. See Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (finding “routine” 
practice for a corporation is not enough to show “how and why” an attorney’s position as corporate 
attorney was used to aid and abet his client, and, that instead, “knowing participation” must be proven); 
see also Chambers v. Weinstein, No. 157781/2013, 2014 WL 4276910, at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 
2014), aff’d in part, 135 A.D.3d 450 (App. Div. 2016) (mem.) (requiring actual knowledge, and finding 
that e-mails are sufficient to prove or dispute knowledge); Bullmore v. Ernst & Young Cayman Island, 
846 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (App. Div. 2007) (stating actual knowledge is required); Kaufman v. Cohen, 
760 N.Y.S.2d 157, 169 (App. Div. 2003) (finding actual knowledge is required, and that constructive 
knowledge is legally insufficient to impose liability under an aiding and abetting theory); Chem-Age 
Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 776–78 (S.D. 2002) (holding constructive knowledge may 
suffice). 
33. See, e.g., Chambers, 2014 WL 4276910, at *13 (dismissing an aiding and abetting claim when 
the plaintiff failed to meet the proper knowledge standard).  
34. See supra Part II.A.  
35. Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 2009). 
36. PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
387 S.W.3d 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).  
37. Tensfeldt, 768 N.W.2d at 644. 
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the divorce judgment that required his client to leave two-thirds of his net 
estate to his three children, the attorney intentionally drafted an estate plan 
where a majority of the estate fell into an inter vivos trust.38  When the client 
died and the children did not receive two-thirds of the client’s estate per the 
divorce judgment, the children filed suit and alleged an aiding and abetting 
theory—among other torts—against the attorney.39  The attorney raised a 
defense of immunity and privilege and argued he was protected from 
third-party suits because he merely acted in his role as the client’s attorney.40  
The court agreed that this defense is typically valid; however, the court held 
that the attorney was not entitled to qualified immunity because he was 
informed of the stipulations and was given a copy of the divorce judgment 
by both the client and the client’s previous attorney.  Nevertheless, the 
attorney drafted documents attempting to give his client “something he was 
not legally entitled to—an estate plan that violated a court judgment.”41  
The Tensfeldt court explained that, although an attorney is typically 
immune from third-party liability “based on the attorney’s failure to perform 
a duty owed to a client[,] . . . [his] failure to perform an obligation to a client 
is entirely distinct from conduct that assists the client committing an 
unlawful act to the detriment of a third party.”42  More specifically, such 
“immunity does not apply when the attorney acts in a malicious, fraudulent 
or tortious manner which frustrates the administration of justice or to obtain 
something for the client to which the client is not justly entitled.”43  
Therefore, the attorney was found liable for aiding and abetting his client’s 
unlawful act when he knowingly drafted an estate plan that was in violation 
of a court order; and, as such, was not entitled to the privilege of 
immunity.44  
Similarly, in PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P., the 
court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim, 
and found liability for breach of a fiduciary duty owed to several 
 
38. Id. at 645–46.  
39. Id. at 647.  
40. Id. at 656. 
41. Id. at 645–46, 656–58.  
42. Id. at 656. 
43. Id. at 657. 
44. Id. at 658. 
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partnerships.45  The court found a valid claim when the attorney prepared 
joint-use agreements and quitclaim deeds without prior written consent and 
with knowledge that doing so would violate previous agreements with other 
partnerships.46  In that case, several entities entered into three partnership 
agreements to create and manage apartment complexes between 2004 and 
2005.47  Though represented by a firm, one attorney had the responsibility 
of preparing documents and opinion letters regarding the legitimacy and 
execution of the agreements.48  Thus, when the partnerships discovered the 
general partner was misappropriating funds, they filed suit and subpoenaed 
documents from the attorney.49  It was at that time they filed an amended 
complaint to include a lawsuit against the attorney and firm for aiding and 
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.50 
Although the court found the complaint “too vague to satisfy the 
requirements” and not adequate to demonstrate the “substantial” assistance 
requirement for a valid aiding and abetting cause of action, it recognized a 
need to view the allegation in full context.51  In doing so, two specific 
instances demonstrating the attorney’s substantial assistance and knowledge 
were found.52  Therefore, the court allowed the tort of aiding and abetting 
a breach of fiduciary duty, and reversed the lower court’s decision.53  
2.    Courts That Found an Attorney Could be Liable for Aiding & 
Abetting 
In an attempt to clarify the existing uncertainty and lack of specific 
guidance on the issue, a few courts examined the allegations and found that 
the facts may or could support a determination that the attorney is subject to 
liability under the aiding and abetting theory.54  In many of those cases, 
 
45. See PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
387 S.W.3d 525, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a claim for aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty). 
46. Id. at 552–53. 
47. Id. at 533. 
48. Id. at 533–34. 
49. Id. at 534–35. 
50. Id. at 535. 
51. Id. at 552. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 552, 558. 
54. See Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647, 654 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding an 
attorney may be liable for aiding and abetting a client to commit fraud); see also Alexander v. Anstine, 
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however, the courts did not reach a determination on the merits for varying 
reasons.55  
The prima facie standard for an aiding and abetting claim varies slightly 
from state to state, even among those jurisdictions that clearly accept the 
theory as a whole.  For example, one California court noted that “a 
defendant can be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in 
the absence of an independent duty owed to the plaintiff[,]”56 while a 
Colorado court held in Alexander v. Anstine,57 that “attorneys do not owe a 
fiduciary duty to non-clients, but . . . anyone who knowingly participates in 
the principal’s breach may be held liable for aiding and abetting the 
breach.”58  
Similarly, a Georgia court granted a defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, reiterating that an aiding and abetting tort requires a plaintiff to 
establish the following elements:  
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the defendant 
acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer’s fiduciary duty to the  
 
152 P.3d 497, 500 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (discussing whether an attorney may be held liable for aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty to a non-client). 
55. See Panoutsopoulos, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654 (recognizing aiding and abetting as a potential 
claim, but not deciding the issue because the plaintiff could not prove the attorneys acted beyond their 
representative role); see also Alexander, 152 P.3d at 503 (addressing aiding and abetting, but not deciding 
the issue on the basis of standing). 
56. Am. Master Lease, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567.  An interesting comparison can be drawn to a 
distinct California case—Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss—where a California Court of Appeals addressed a 
different legal theory alleged against a lawyer.  See 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654 (citations omitted) (“An 
attorney may be held liable for conspiring with his or her client to commit actual fraud or for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  But plaintiffs can state a viable claim only if the attorneys’ 
actions went beyond their role as attorneys . . . .”).  In that case, the plaintiff failed to state a viable 
claim.  Id. at 654–55.  Distinctively, however, California cases have long supported the notion that an 
attorney can be liable for participation in a breach.  See Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243 
(Ct. App. 1991) (finding an attorney liable for participating in the trustees’ breach of fiduciary duty), 
superseded by statute, 1991 CAL. STAT. 4108, as recognized in Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 
136 (Ct. App. 2000); see also King v. Johnston, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 280–81 (Ct. App. 2009) (imposing 
liability on a third-party for her participation in a breach of trust); Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 
90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 793 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding an attorney liable for his involvement in a breach of 
trust); City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 356 
(Ct. App. 1998) (finding a financial advisor liable for its participation in a breach of trust). 
57. Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).   
58. Id. at 500.  The Colorado court, however, did not address the merits of the case because the 
plaintiff lacked standing.  Id. at 503.  As a result, deciding whether the attorney was liable for a valid 
claim of aiding and abetting was left “for another day.”  Id. 
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plaintiff; (2) with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a 
fiduciary duty, the defendant acted purposely and with malice and the intent 
to injure; (3) the defendant’s wrongful conduct procured a breach of the 
primary wrongdoer’s fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct 
proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.59 
In that case, the plaintiff was involved in a land dispute and was ordered 
to pay an awarded amount.60  Prior to the judgment, the plaintiff transferred 
his personal assets into a trust and hired several attorneys to protect it.61  
When the plaintiff failed to pay the judgment, his creditors filed suit claiming 
he and his co-trustees fraudulently transferred assets to prevent collection 
of the judgment.62  With the attorneys’ advice, the trustee settled the dispute 
and sold a part of the assets, specifically a cattle ranch, without the plaintiff’s 
approval.63  As a result, the plaintiff filed suit against the attorneys for aiding 
and abetting, but summary judgment was awarded to the defense attorneys 
because all elements for aiding and abetting were not met.64  The court 
emphasized that aiding and abetting cases required an attorney to act 
improperly and without privilege, which meant acting outside the scope of 
representation.65  Thus, summary judgment was proper because the 
attorneys took an active role in all aspects of the litigation and were not 
strangers to the trust.66  Much like the above-discussed decisions, the 
Georgia court was deprived of the opportunity to further address the details 
of the claim when it granted the summary judgment motion.67 
  
 
59. Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting White v. 
Shamrock Bldg. Sys., Inc., 669 S.E.2d 168, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)).  In Kahn, the defense was granted 
summary judgment on the aiding and abetting claim.  Id. at 459. 
60. Id. at 452. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 458–59. 
65. See id. at 458 (concluding the elements for an aiding and abetting claim were not met). 
66. Id. at 459. 
67. See id. (upholding a grant of summary judgment). 
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3.    Courts That Reversed and Remanded Summary Judgment Because 
Existing Facts Do or May Support the Finding of Liability for Aiding & 
Abetting 
Many courts have recently,68 and previously,69 addressed aiding and 
abetting allegations and determined such allegations were possibly 
supported by proper grounds.  As such, these courts reversed summary 
judgments issued by lower courts, and remanded for further 
determination.70  Similar to others, these courts expressed their approval of 
the theory and attached liability, but did not engage in the factual 
determination and final case disposition.71  For example, in one case, the 
court ruled that the allegations made were sufficient to satisfy the elements 
of an aiding and abetting cause of action.72  Similarly, in a different case, the 
 
68. See Stueve Bros. Farms, L.L.C. v. Berger Kahn, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 133 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(reversing a lower court’s decision to allow a cause of action for aiding and abetting, and explaining “a 
third[-]party who knowingly assists a trustee in breaching his or her fiduciary duty may, dependent 
upon the circumstances, be held liable along with that trustee for participating in the breach of trust”).  
In American Master, two theories of liability for aiding and abetting were recognized by the court.  Am. 
Master Lease, L.L.C. v. Idanta Partners, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548, 569 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Thus, there are 
two different theories pursuant to which a person may be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty.”).  Under the first theory, the court required “that the aider and abettor owe a fiduciary 
duty to the victim and . . . that the aider and abettor provide substantial assistance to the person 
breaching his or her fiduciary duty.”  Id.  Under the second theory, liability arises “when the aider and 
abettor commits an independent tort”––i.e., makes a “conscious decision to participate in tortious 
activity for the purpose of assisting another in performing a wrongful act.”  Id. at 568–69.  The second 
theory was argued and proved by the plaintiffs in American Master, which established a valid claim.  Id. 
69. See, e.g., Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(reversing the lower court’s decision to dismiss a claim).  Although Illinois courts have never found 
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting a client in the commission of an unlawful act, courts “have not 
prohibited such actions.”  Id. at 768.  Illinois courts have established that, an attorney “may not use his 
license to practice law as a shield to protect himself from the consequences of his participation in an 
unlawful or illegal conspiracy.”  Id. (quoting Celano v. Frederick, 203 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1964)).  Moreover, “[t]he same policy should prevent an attorney from escaping liability for knowingly 
and substantially assisting a client in the commission of a tort.”  Id.  The case was reversed and 
remanded to allow an aiding and abetting claim against the attorney.  Id.  
70. See Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., No. 267233, 2006 WL 1867716, at *11 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 6, 2006) (reversing and remanding for a jury trial to determine if aiding and 
abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty claim was viable); Thornwood, 799 N.E.2d at 769 (reversing and 
remanding for further inquiry). 
71. See, e.g., Am. Master Lease, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567 (noting attorneys may be liable for aiding 
and abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty only if the necessary elements are met, and remanding for 
further determination).  
72. See In re Senior Cottages of Am., 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a tort was 
committed against the plaintiff, that the defendant’s attorney knew the primary tortfeasor’s conduct 
was in breach of a duty, and that the attorney substantially assisted in that breach). 
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court found grounds for a valid aiding and abetting claim based on the 
attorney’s knowledge and participation in the breach that resulted in the 
plaintiff’s damages.73  In another case, the court explained that although it 
appeared all aiding and abetting elements were met, an additional showing 
of specific instances of “substantial” assistance were required—a statement 
alone was too vague to satisfy the element.74 
As an example, the Court of Appeals of Arizona in Chalpin v. Snyder75 
reversed the lower court’s decision that aiding and abetting liability was not 
valid and remanded for further consideration.76  In that case, an insurer 
added the insured’s president’s daughter to a commercial vehicle liability 
policy.77  When the daughter was in a car accident, the insurer affirmed that 
the accident would be covered and that the insurer would defend the 
litigation.78  A law firm was hired by the insurer to attempt to disavow 
coverage when settlement attempts failed.79  Although the attorney and law 
firm opined that the insurer could not deny coverage, they nevertheless 
suggested filing a declaratory claim.80  Even though judgment was rendered 
in favor of the insured, the insured filed a suit against the law firm and the 
attorney for aiding and abetting, as well as for malicious prosecution.81  
In Chalpin, the court reiterated that aiding and abetting claims have been 
previously determined valid in civil lawsuits by Arizona courts.82  Moreover, 
it explained Arizona’s higher court previously clarified “lawyers have no 
special privilege against civil suit.”83  Accordingly, it rejected the lower 
court’s finding that aiding and abetting liability is not a valid cause of action 
against lawyers and remanded for further proceedings.84 
 
73. See Tamposi v. Denby, 974 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61–62 (D. Mass. 2013) (affirming the plaintiff 
had a valid aiding and abetting claim). 
74. See PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
387 S.W.3d 525, 552–53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (highlighting two specific instances where the attorney 
provided substantial assistance, and concluding a reasonable inference could be made that the attorney 
acted with knowledge in aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, allowing the tort to survive a 
motion to dismiss). 
75. Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
76. Id. at 678. 
77. Id. at 668–69. 
78. Id. at 669.  
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 669–70. 
81. Id. at 670.  
82. Id. at 677. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 678. 
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Similar to many previous decisions, numerous courts confirmed the 
theoretical validity of aiding and abetting claims, while offering very little in 
terms of the specific factual guidelines to be applied to predict the outcome 
in specific scenarios.85  Based on varying precedent from across the nation, 
it is now obvious the aiding and abetting theory is an overall acceptable 
avenue for relief that can potentially be established.86  However, it remains 
unclear what type of facts will likely lead to a guaranteed recovery and 
monetary gain under the theory.87 
4.    Courts That Have Dismissed the Cause of Action Because the 
Facts and Allegations Did Not Support a Finding of Aiding & Abetting 
Liability 
A number of cases nationwide examined the aiding and abetting 
allegations in the past, and determined that the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish liability due to insufficient facts for various reasons.88  Similarly, 
various courts examined the facts presented and determined that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish one or more elements needed for the prima facie 
 
85. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 150 (“Although a number of jurisdictions agree on the 
essential elements that need to be established in order to state a claim for attorney’s aiding and abetting 
her client’s breach of fiduciary duty, these courts’ requirements are certainly not identical.”).   
86. See id. (“Most states require the plaintiff to demonstrate knowledge or knowing 
participation, substantial assistance in the breach, and damages.  The threshold requirement in virtually 
all jurisdictions is for the plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant attorney’s client owed a fiduciary duty 
to the plaintiff.”).  
87. See id. (arguing courts are not consistent when establishing the requirements of a claim for 
attorneys aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty). 
88. See Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 503 (Colo. 2007) (concluding a lawsuit against an 
attorney for aiding and abetting cannot be sustained when the plaintiff is unable to prove the attorney’s 
client breached a fiduciary duty in the first place); Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 
323 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty 
must fail as a matter of law because there was no duty.”); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 
601 N.W.2d 179, 188–89 (Minn. 1999) (reasoning the plaintiff failed to establish substantial assistance 
in the breach because he lacked “actual knowledge” that the primary tort-feasor’s conduct was 
wrongful); Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756, 762–63 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (noting “[t]he social benefit 
of proper legal advice and assistance often makes it appropriate not to hold lawyers liable for activities 
in the course of a representation[;]” however, the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action because 
the alleged aiding and abetting attorney acted only to protect the client’s interests and was not outside 
the scope of her duties); Bullmore v. Ernst & Young Cayman Island, 846 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148–49 
(App. Div. 2007) (dismissing a claim for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty because the 
plaintiff failed to prove actual knowledge or substantial assistance); Kaufman v. Cohen, 760 N.Y.S.2d 
157, 169–70 (App. Div. 2003) (determining the plaintiff was unable to establish all elements of an 
aiding and abetting claim because the knowledge requirement was based on conclusory statements). 
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case of aiding and abetting.89  One court, for example, reiterated that in 
order to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law, a 
Plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a 
breach of the fiduciary’s duty, and (3) a knowing participation in that breach 
by [the alleged aider and abettor].”90  Similarly, a different court emphasized 
“public policy demands that attorneys, in the exercise of their proper 
functions as such, shall not be civilly liable for their acts when performed in 
good faith and for the honest purpose of protecting the interests of their 
clients.”91  In that case, determining the attorney did not act outside the 
scope of his duty, the court explained, “[W]here one acts only in the 
execution of the duties of his calling or profession, and does not go beyond 
it, and does not actually participate in the trespass, he is not liable, though 
what he does may aid another in its commission.”92  
In one particular instance, the court determined a plaintiff failed to 
establish the “knowing participation” requirement of the claim because 
“routine” practices for a corporation are not enough to show “how and 
why” an attorney’s position as a corporate lawyer was used for aiding and 
abetting purposes.93  Similarly, a different court held a plaintiff failed to 
establish the “actual knowledge” element of an aiding and abetting claim, 
explaining that “[t]o find a defendant secondarily liable as aiding and 
abetting an unlawful breach of fiduciary duty, the defendant aider and 
abettor himself must know that the primary wrongdoer’s conduct constitutes 
a breach of duty and give substantial assistance or encouragement to that 
wrongdoer to so act.”94  To further clarify the requirements of the 
substantial assistance element, a different court explained that conditional 
advice must have a direct link to a defendant’s actions thereafter “however 
suspect and legally vulnerable it might be.”95  In that case, the plaintiff failed 
to establish the injury and damages element pertaining to the claim.96 
 
89. See, e.g., Bullmore, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 148 (describing the elements of a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting, and finding the plaintiff failed to allege actual knowledge or substantial participation 
against the defendants). 
90. Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (citation omitted). 
91. Art Capital Grp., L.L.C. v. Neuhaus, 896 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 2010). 
92. Id. (quoting Ford v. Williams, 13 N.Y. 577, 584 (1856)).  
93. Zazzali, 482 B.R. at 519. 
94. Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307–08 n.1 (D. N.J. 2012). 
95. In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 438 B.R. 414, 427 (D. Minn. 2010). 
96. Id. at 428. 
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Despite a majority consensus on the validity of the aiding and abetting 
theory, it is rather difficult to prevail on such a claim.  Since only a handful 
of plaintiffs actually recover damages against an attorney under the aiding 
and abetting theory, it is difficult to predict which specific facts would be 
needed to guarantee, or at least improve, the chances of recovery.97  
5.    Federal Courts That Have Recognized the Cause of Action 
Since 2008, several federal courts have recognized claims for aiding and 
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty, even though state courts in the 
applicable jurisdiction have not.98  In recognizing a cause of action for 
aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach, some federal courts provided a 
specific analysis, discussing why the pertinent state would have likely 
recognized the cause of action, and how the state court would have decided 
the issue—if given the opportunity.99  Federal courts often had to respond 
to a defendant lawyer’s motion to dismiss the cause of action, and their 
rulings in those cases varied.100  Among those, some decisions took an 
 
97. See, e.g., PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. 
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding to the chancery court to try the case on 
its merits).   
98. See Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 499–500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (rejecting a 
plausible aiding and abetting claim, and explaining that “even if it hasn’t yet recognized the cause of 
action, the Indiana Supreme Court would do so,” because aiding and abetting liability is not a separate 
tort, “but rather a theory for holding a person liable who knowingly assists . . . a wrongdoer”).  The 
court further reasoned that recognizing an aiding and abetting claim would “not represent a departure 
for Indiana courts . . . for the particular tort of breach of fiduciary duty.”  Id.  But see Crystal Valley 
Sales, Inc. v. Anderson, 22 N.E.3d 646, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Indiana does not recognize such a 
cause of action [for aiding and abetting].  We believe that the decision to adopt a new cause of action 
for aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duty is a decision better left to the legislature or our 
supreme court.”). 
99. For example, in Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen, L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 337 (E.D. Pa. 
2007), rev’d on other grounds, 426 F. App’x 79 (3d Cir. 2011), the court predicted that, if given the 
opportunity, the “Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for aiding and 
abetting breach of a fiduciary duty.”  Id. at 350.  In particular, the court set forth three elements for 
aiding and abetting breach of a fiduciary duty under Pennsylvania law: “(1) a breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed to another; (2) knowledge of the breach by the aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance 
or encouragement by the aider and abettor in effecting that breach.”  Id.  In a separate case and 
jurisdiction, the court stated that the “New Hampshire Supreme Court has yet to expressly consider 
whether to adopt the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty . . . [but] would recognize 
the tort, and would adopt a version incorporating the principles of aiding and abetting liability set forth 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”  Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 
82–83 (1st Cir. 2001).  
100. See, e.g., Design Pallets, Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 
2007) (refusing to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged valid claims and 
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approach similar to the one adopted by state courts, determining the 
plaintiff had insufficient facts to establish liability under the aiding and 
abetting theory.101  As an example, one such claim failed because the court 
determined no fiduciary duty existed, and accordingly, the plaintiff could 
not establish the element of substantial assistance.102  
In that case, the plaintiff, acting on behalf of several hedge funds, brought 
suit for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims, 
against its former directors and fund administrators for damages caused 
directly to the hedge funds.103  In particular, the plaintiff claimed the 
defendants did not adequately inform investors in the hedge funds about 
specific securities each fund held, and thus acted fraudulently for their own 
personal gain.104  The plaintiff failed, though, to allege facts that showed 
the “special circumstances” necessary to allege a fiduciary duty on the part 
of the primary wrongdoer, as is required by state law.105  The court further 
clarified that the complaint only stated conclusory allegations as “conscious 
intent” and, in doing so, relied on an opinion that provided no support to 
its claim.106  Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim because the first 
element for a valid aiding and abetting cause of action could not be met.107  
 
damages existed).  In Abrams, however, the court actually dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff 
could not plausibly establish the element of substantial assistance—i.e., that an underlying breach of 
fiduciary duty actually occurred.  Abrams, 518 B.R. at 504.  The court further reasoned Indiana law does 
not recognize the claim but likely would if given the opportunity.  Id. 
101. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 566900, at *12 
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
102. See, e.g., Court Appointed Receiver of Lancer Offshore, Inc. v. Citco Grp. Ltd., 
No. 05-60080-CIV, 2011 WL 1233126, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2011) (“As analyzed in the section on 
gross negligence, the Court finds that the Receiver’s attempt to allege that CGL and CFS-USA owed 
the Funds a duty to disclose is untenable.”). 
103. Id. at *1 n.1, *4. 
104. Id. at *3 n.4, *3. 
105. See id. at *4 (“Here, . . . Receiver argues the Director Defendants’ fiduciary duty should be 
imputed to CGL and CFS-USA . . . .  [T]he Court concludes that this claim fails . . . .”).   
106. Id. at *5. 
107. See id. (“Since it cannot be said that CGL and CFS-USA had a duty to disclose . . . and 
because the SAC does not contain allegations that set forth the requisite degree of scienter for 
conscious intent, this [aiding and abetting claim] will be dismissed with prejudice.”). 
 
176 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 8:158 
C.    States That Do Not Recognize the Cause of Action or Remain Unsure 
While only some courts in a handful of states, such as Alabama,108 
Michigan,109 and Texas,110 have previously declined to recognize aiding 
and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action, a few 
jurisdictions have recently joined them.111  Specifically, Louisiana law does 
not recognize aiding and abetting as a cognizable claim, though its courts 
admit other states like New York and Delaware do.112  In Broyles v. Cantor 
Fitzgerald & Co.,113 the court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that even 
though the plaintiff was able to establish aiding and abetting elements, such 
a claim was not actionable in the state of Louisiana.114  
Some courts remain confused on the issue of validity regarding the aiding 
and abetting theory in their jurisdiction, while others believe such a claim 
would not be recognized by their state.115  For example, a North Carolina 
 
108. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 566900, at *13 
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).  There, 
the court stated it was unable to “find any substantial support . . . that the common law tort of aiding 
and abetting a fiduciary breach exists under Alabama law.”  Id. at *11. 
109. See Kraniak v. Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C., No. 230028, 2002 WL 1308783, at *3 
(Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2002) (per curiam) (“No such cause of action in relation to a legal malpractice 
claim has been recognized in Michigan and we are not inclined to create such a claim in this 
case . . . . [E]ven if there were authority to support such a claim in Michigan, Plaintiff’s claim would 
fail.”). 
110. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st. Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“[W]e decline [plaintiff]’s invitation to expand Texas law to allow 
a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding and abetting’ a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon 
the rendition of legal advice to an alleged tortfeasor client.”). 
111. See DeVries Dairy, L.L.C. v. White Eagle Coop. Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 1194, 1194 (Ohio 2012) 
(choosing not to recognize a civil action for aiding and abetting tortious conduct); see also Sacksteder v. 
Senney, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing a malpractice 
action against a corporate lawyer for participating in a breach of fiduciary duty); Broyles v. Cantor 
Fitzgerald & Co., Nos. 10-864-JJB, 10-857-JJB, 2013 WL 1681150, at *13 (M.D. La. Apr. 17, 2013) 
(“However, the Court also recognizes that under Louisiana law, [aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty] is not a cognizable claim.”).  
112. See, e.g., Broyles, 2013 WL 1681150, at *13 (acknowledging Louisiana law does not find 
aiding and abetting to be a cognizable claim, but finding sufficient facts for a valid claim of aiding and 
abetting under New York and Delaware law).  
113. Broyles v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., No. 10-864-JJB, 2013 WL 1681150 (M.D. La. 
Apr. 17, 2013). 
114. Id. at *13. 
115. See Veer Right Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Czarnowski Display Serv., No. 14 CVS 1038, 2015 WL 
504977, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2015) (admitting uncertainty about whether North Carolina 
recognizes aiding and abetting); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 
566900, at *13 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (“Alabama law does not recognize the common law cause of 
action of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”). 
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court has stated the validity of a claim for aiding and abetting “remains an 
open question,”116 while another found that “no such cause of action exists 
in North Carolina[,]” and that it remains “undisputed that the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has never recognized such cause of action.”117  
Distinctively, another North Carolina court reiterated the lack of clarity on 
the issue by stating “[a]s numerous North Carolina decisions have now 
recognized . . . it is . . . unclear whether North Carolina recognizes a claim 
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.”118  
However, even jurisdictions that declined to accept the aiding and 
abetting theory as a cause of action against attorneys have not done so in 
absolute terms.119  For instance, Texas common law states that it is “well 
settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third 
parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a 
client[;]”120 and, Texas courts remain consistent in their refusal “to expand 
Texas law to allow a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding and 
abetting’ a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon the rendition of legal advice 
to an alleged tortfeasor client.”121  Simultaneously, it has been clarified 
“attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients if they conclusively 
establish their alleged conduct was within the scope of their legal 
representation of a client,”122 because this “attorney-immunity defense is 
intended to ensure ‘loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys 
employed as advocates.’”123  As such, an attorney is not shielded from 
liability to non-clients for their “actions when they do not qualify as ‘the 
kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties 
to his client.’”124  According to Texas courts, the protection from liability 
 
116. Veer Right Mgmt. Grp., 2015 WL 504977, at *3.   
117. Bottom v. Bailey, 767 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).   
118. Bradshaw v. Maiden, No. 14 CVS 14445, 2015 WL 4720387, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2015).  
119. See Cantey Hanger, L.L.P. v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (finding it “well settled 
that an attorney does not owe a professional care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s 
negligent representation of a client”).  
120. Id. 
121. Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, 
no pet.) (quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)). 
122. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15-00055-CV, 
2016 WL 164528, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2016, no pet.). 
123. Id. 
124. See Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 482, 485 (quoting Dixon Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 
Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., No. 01-06-00696, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (Tex. App.––
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2008, pet. denied)) (holding petitioner law firm was entitled to summary 
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does not apply because such actions are “entirely foreign to the duties of an 
attorney” and “not part of the discharge of an attorney’s duties in 
representing a party.”125   
III.    CONCLUSION 
Currently, a majority of states accept the validity of the aiding and abetting 
theory against attorneys, stating the specific elements required to establish 
its prima facie case, while offering very little guidance on how plaintiffs can 
successfully meet the burden by supporting it with sufficient facts.  What 
makes the matter more complicated is a lack of precedent awarding 
plaintiffs’ recovery under an aiding and abetting theory,126 and the failure 
to provide guidance regarding which facts are sufficient to result in an 
award.  At the moment, it appears unlikely that new decisions offering 
specificity are on the way, as none of the courts are likely to commit to 
creating a new standard that will reshape the confusion in that area; thereby, 
providing guidance on the issue.  Thus, the actual theory exists and appears 
to be an option to pursue, but what would it take for a plaintiff to succeed?  
That question remains unanswered, creating a tremendous challenge for 
attorneys who need clear guidance on liability and exposure prevention for 
their clients, as well as themselves.  At this time, it appears the best attorneys 
can do to protect themselves from liability in that area is to strictly stay 
within the boundaries of “merely providing legal advice” to their client.  
Even that concept, however, is not clearly defined, placing various scenarios 
in a gray area—that is, defining what “pure legal advice” actually means.  In 
addition, legal malpractice insurers need to factor aiding and abetting claims 
into their calculations of policy costs and, due to the lack of guidance, 
insurers are likely to overcharge their customers as a precaution.  One 
 
judgment on its immunity defense because it established that its alleged conduct was within the scope 
of its legal representation of its client); see also Highland Capital Mgmt., 2016 WL 164528, at *1 (affirming 
summary judgment because the defendant attorney acted within the scope of his representation of his 
client, and was protected by qualified immunity).  
125. Highland Capital Mgmt., 2016 WL 164528, at *4. 
126. See, e.g., In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(demonstrating the difficult burden of proof faced by plaintiffs in aiding and abetting cases, where 
there is no standard in place and damages are often speculative). 
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previously proposed solution is to resolve the issue by statute,127 but sadly 
that solution has not been adopted. 
Interestingly, a number of lawyers do not fear this theory for themselves 
or their clients because they do not learn about it in law school or in practice 
(unless they specialize in legal malpractice), which invites the famous saying: 
“ignorance is bliss.”128  However, ignorance is obviously not a solution.  
Courts need to take the aiding and abetting theory seriously, i.e., not merely 
offer theoretical guidance on what it takes to prove its prima facie case, but 
also examine the applicable facts closely and offer true guidance—a long 
time needed precedent—that lawyers, judges, and the legal system itself can 
properly use in future cases.  We must have the opportunity to use stare 
decisis in every area of law, including aiding and abetting a client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against lawyers!  
 
 
127. Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 171–72 (proposing to enact statutes to reduce claims, save time 
and expenses, and allow judges the ability to become familiar with the type of claims to help render 
decisions). 
128. THOMAS GRAY, SELECT POEMS OF THOMAS GRAY 54 (New York, Harper & Bro’s 1895) 
(coining the term “ignorance is bliss”); Michael Brandon, The 100 Most Famous Quotable Quotes of all 
Time, CURATED QUOTES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.curatedquotes.com/famous-quotes/ 
[https://perma.cc/N6KJ-QDSL] (including the phrase “ignorance is bliss” in the “hall of fame” of 
quotes). 
